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THE INVIOLABILITYCONTROVERSY IN THE TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI
Ronald L. Hayworth
Arkansas College
The attempt at constitutional monarchy during the French Revolu-
tion ended abruptly on August 10, 1792, with the dethronement of
Louis XVI in what has been termed the Second French Revolution. 1
One major problem that the new National Convention faced when it
convened in mid-September was the determination of the fate of the
ci-devant roi. The solution of this dilemma, generally designated by
historians as Louis XVI's trial, falls between November 6, 1792, the
date of the first full-scale report to the Convention on evidence against
Louis, and January 21, 1793, the date of his execution.
The thesis of this paper is that much of the debate at the tribune
of the Convention during Louis XVI's trial revolved around the issue of
royal inviolability
—
that is, whether or not the king was inviolable
and therefore not subject to trial — but that arguments in support of
inviolability were in fact academic and dilatory: academic because
they were largely theoretical and advanced without expectation of
practical results, dilatory because they formed a part of the efforts of
some Girondin deputies to delay the trial and save the king.
With few exceptions the royal inviolability controversy centered
on the provisions on royalty in the Constitution of 1791. It is therefore
appropriate to cite the pertinent articles of Section I: "Of the Royalty
and the King":
Article 2: The person of the king is inviolable and sacred: his only
title is King of the French.
Article 5: If, one month after the invitation of the legislative body,
the King shall not have taken this oath [given in article 4], or if,
after having taken it, he retracts it, he shall be considered to have
abdicated the throne.
Article 6: If the King puts himself at the head of an army and
directs the forces thereof against the nation, or if he does not by
a formal instrument place himself in opposition to any such enter-
prise which may be conducted in his name, he shall be considered
to have abdicated the throne.
Article 7: If the King, having left the kingdom, should not return
after the invitation which shall be made to him for that purpose
by the legislative body and within the period which shall be fixed
'Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793 (New
York, 1962), pp. 227-247.
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by the proclamation, which shall not be less than two months, he
shall be considered to have abdicated the throne.
Article 8: After the express or legal abdication, the king shall be
in the class of citizens and can be tried like them for acts subse-
quent to his abdication. 2
Discussion on these articles by the National Assembly aroused no
heated arguments; none of the approximately eighty Constituents, sub-
sequently deputies to the Convention, apparently raised a voice against
them. 3 But a vigorous challenge of royal inviolability followed the
king's flight to Varennes in June, 1791. Several future conventionnels,
among them Jerome Pe'tion de Villeneuve, Maximilien Robespierre, and
Francois Buzot, attacked the dogma and demanded that Louis be tried
by the legislative body or a specially-convened Convention. 4
Inviolability became an official issue in Louis's trial with the
presentation of a report by the Convention's Legislative Committee on
November 7, 1792. In the first section the reporter Jean-Baptiste Mailhe
listed as the first of several questions discussed by the committee:
"Is Louis XVI jugeable for the crimes he is imputed to have committed
on the constitutional throne?" The committee, in effect, had concluded
in the affirmative. The Legislative Assembly suspended Louis and
returned to the nation all the powers formerly confided in the monarch.
The nation had in turn elected the Convention as the organ of its
sovereign will, thereby effecting the negation of royal inviolability.
In essence, continued Mailhe, "royal inviolability is as if it had never
existed.
"
The report further stated that the penal code, which stipulated
death for treasonable activity, furnished the law whereby Louis could
be judged. The committee report ended with a fourteen-article projet
for consideration by the Convention, the first article of which read:
"Louis XVIcan be tried."5 The Convention rejected a Jacobin proposal
to add "and ought to be tried," but it postponed discussion of the
committee's report. 6
2Frank AAaloy Anderson (ed.), The Constitutions and Other Select Docu
ments Illustrative of the History of France, 1789-1907. Second Edition
(Minneapolis, 1908), p. 71.
3J. Mavidal and E. Laurent (eds.) Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a
1860: Recueil complet des debats legislatifs et politiques des Chambres
francaises; Premiere se'rie (1787 a 1799) (Paris, 1867-1913), IX,24-25,
cited hereafter as Archives.
4Edward Seligman, La Justice en France pendant la Revolution (1789-
1793). Second Edition (Paris, 1913), II,31.
LI1 1, 275-281, Proces-Verbal de la Convention Nationale
(Paris, 1793-1795), III, 6-7; cited hereafter as Proces-Verbal. For a
brief summary of the report see Albert Mathiez, The French Revolution
(New York, 1962), pp. 255-256.
LIN, 282.
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The decision to concentrate attention only on the first article of
the committee's projet came on November 13, as the result of a motion
by Petion, a former Jacobin now associated with the Right in the Con-
vention. In the course of his brief comments he clearly attacked "the
stupid dogma of inviolability,
'
and cited his long-standing opposition
to it. But, he concluded, it was important to prove, with the law in
hand, that Louis could not invoke the law.7
In the course of the next two weeks ten deputies read prepared
speeches on royal inviolability. Not all of those either for or against
the dogma developed the same arguments respectively. Among the
predominantly Girondin conventionnels supporting it, for example,
Charles Morisson said that the death penalty prescribed for treason in
the penal code was not applicable to Louis, since his crimes were com-
mitted while he was under the Constitution; also, there was no other
pre-existant laws by which Louis could be tried. Therefore, the Legisla-
tive Assembly had applied the maximum penalty when it dethroned
this "enemy of the French." 8 Claude Fauchet put emphasis primarily
on the need of a pre-existant law;9 Jean-AAarie Rouzet admitted that
Louis was probably jugeable in the sense of the committee's report,
but argued that it was not in the interest of the nation to try him;10
and Pierre-Joseph Faure decried the existence of inviolability, that "loi
barbare, loi absurde,
'
but insisted that it did exist and had to be
respected. 11
But if diversity existed among the speakers defending inviolability
it was equally evident in opposition speeches. Antoine Saint-Just
attacked as false not only AAorisson's defense of the dogma, but the
Legislative Committee's view that Louis could be tried as a citizen.
The ex-king, he declared, should be tried as an enemy of France. 12
Taking another approach, Pierre Francois Robert cited the Declaration
of the Rights of Man to the effect the law should be the same for all,
whether it protected or punished. The nation, incensed at the grant of
inviolability to the king, became a "living law" on August 10 and
proclaimed by its action that Louis would be judged. 13 But on Decem-
ber 3, in what is sometimes referred to as the "Montagnard thesis"
7lbid., LIU, 385
sibid., Llll, 387-389.
sibid., Llll, 393-394.
Llll, 421-422.
"Ibid., Llll, 638
'2|bid., Llll, 390
i3|bid., Llll, 395-396.
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on this subject, 14 AAaximilien Robespierre attacked not so much the
validity of royal inviolability as its relevance to the case at hand.
Louis XVI, he argued, was not an accused, the conventionnels were
nor judges. No trial was necessary since the king had already been
tried by the people in the August 10 insurrection: "Louis cannot
therefore be judged; he has already been condemned. . ,"15
Parenthetically, the inviolability issue was by no means confined
to debate at the tribune of the Convention. A number of contemporary
pamphlets supported the king's inviolability, two of which are particular-
ly noteworthy. Jacques Necker, the former finance minister of Louis
XVI, argued that the king could not be tried as a particular, and that
furthermore he had not violated any constitutional laws. He buttressed
royal inviolability with historical references, noted that kings could not
be tried by their peers and certainly not by partial men, and declared
the doctrine both just and necessary. 16 In response to Necker's pub-
lished views, an anonymous pamphleteer claimed for Louis not only
constitutional inviolability, but furnished an apparent rarity for this trial:
an impassioned argument for inviolability on the basis of divine-right.
Scolding Necker for avoiding this approach, the writer declared boldly:
"Louis is both the most live image of and the minister of God. By
virtue of this double title he is due a religious homage; to refuse to
render it to him is to commit a sacrilege." 17
The controversy seemed at an end on December 3 when the Na-
tional Convention decreed not only that Louis could be tried, but that
in effect the Convention itself would serve as both judge and jury.
But the issue of royal inviolability reappeared in subsequent phases
of the trial, particularly in arguments by Louis's counsel, and in some
of the orations by conventionnels in the week that followed the formal
defense.
14 This phrase is used by G. Pariset, La Revolution (1792-1799) (Paris,
1920- ), p. 18. The "AAontagnard view" is the phrase used by
M. J. Sydenham, The Girondins (London, 1961), pp. 135-136. Both
refer to Robespierre's thesis that no trial was necessary since Louis
had already been condemned. But Francois Robert, see above p. 4,
a Paris Jacobin, insisted that Louis could be tried; and Jean-Paul
Marat, also a Jacobin, concluded that Louis "soit promptement juge"
in his paper, Journal de la Republique francaise, December 4-5, 1792.
15Archives, LIV, 74-75. Robespierre reiterated these views in a letter
to his constituents on December 14, 1792; see Oeuvres completes de
Robespierre (Paris, 191 2-1 958), V, 135-136.
16 Jacques Necker, Reflexions presentees a la nation francaise sur le
proces intense ct Louis XVI.. . (Paris, 1792), pp. 12, 19-23, 29.
17AA. AA.***, Response aux reflexions de M. Necker, sur le proces
intentee a Louis XVI. . (Paris, 1792), pp. 26, 31-32.
114
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 20 [1966], Art. 19
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol20/iss1/19
115
InviolabilityControversy in Trial of Louis XVI
II
Louis XVI appeared at the bar of the Convention for the first time
on December 11, where he heard the act of accusation and was asked
to examine and respond to certain documents which had been sub-
mitted in evidence against him. Though the Convention voted after
this first confrontation that the ex-king might choose one lawyer or
defender, in the end he had a total of three: Francois-Denis Tronchet,
who accepted Louis's bid after the refusal of the king's first choice;
Lamoignon de AAalesherbes, whose volunteered services Louis accepted;
and Raymond Deseze, whom Louis and the Convention accepted at
the request of the two other members of the defense counsel.
But the defense was handicapped from the outset by the king's
decision to respond to the Convention's charges on December 11. Had
he followed the example of the English King Charles I he would have
refused to recognize the competency of the Convention to try him. His
counsel, despite this handicap, attempted to exploit every possibility to
save the king. The first section of the formal defense, read by Deseze
on the occasion of Louis's second and final appearance before the
Convention on December 26, claimed inviolability (thereby reopening
what seemed a closed issue), the second part reiterated in detail Louis's
responses of December 1 1 to the specific charges brought against him.
Deseze opened this impressive defense at the obvious point: he
denied that the Convention's decisior to try Louis had closed the issue
of royal inviolability. He then proceeded to examine the constitutional
articles which dealt specifically with royalty,^ anc j to build his con-
clusions around them. In the first place, he reasoned, a sovereign
nation delegated the exercise of its sovereignty to its monarch (if, as
in the case of France, it decided to give itself a king), which meant
that the monarchical form of government itself presupposed that the
king was inviolable. Second, there were no limits to that inviolability,
no conditions which altered it. Third, even if the king should commit
the crimes foreseen in the Constitution, that document contained nothing
about the subsequent creation of a tribunal to try the king, nothing of
a trial of any sort, but only of dethronement. Finally, if the king
abdicated or was dethroned, he could be tried thereafter only for
crimes committed after his downfall. 19
These defense arguments apparently made little impression on the
deputies, though some of the attention given to inviolability after
December 26 was in part a reaction to the formal defense. But in the
twenty-nine speeches given after Louis's second and final appearance,
new issues crowded out the old; that is, invioability took a back seat
to the "appeal to the people" movement. Despite its secondary role,
however, inviolability remained, on the surface at least, an issue in
18See above, p. 2.
19Raymond Deseze, Defense de Louis, prononcee a la barre de la Con
vention nationale. . . (Paris, 1792), pp. 4-13; Archives, LV, 618-621.
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many of the speeches delivered between December 27, 1792, and
January 4, 1793. So frequently did mention of it occur, in fact, that
one deputy suggested that the order of appearance at the tribune be
based on defense or attack of inviolability.
That the issue had indeed taken on a less important role was
evident in the decreasing number of deputies who mentioned it. The
fact that only two Jacobins said anything on the subject would suggest
that the Left considered the issue closed, though these deputies did
spend considerable time in their attack. All seven of the deputies who
supported royal inviolability after December 26 were Girondins, includ-
ing Pierre Vergniaud; but such prominent Girondin leaders as Charles
Barbaroux, Buzot, and Petion spoke against the dogma.
But even among the speeches of the Girondins who supported the
dogma there is evidence of an increasing loss of enthusiasm; their argu-
ments showed no refinement and were much the same as those presented
from November 15 to December 3. None incorporated any of the clear
logic provided by the formal defense, though the Girondins could hardly
afford to do so since their support of inviolability had already exposed
them to charges of royalism. The academic nature of their arguments
was again evident. For example, Rouzet, on December 27, termed the
dogma "a monster in the social order," but declared it a reality none-
theless. 20 Hardly less original, Vergniaud called the dogma absurd
but maintained that only the people could withdraw it since they had
granted it initially.21 Petit, not to be outdone in this parade of cliches,
pointed to the necessity of a pre-existant law, a law established prior
to the crime, by which Louis could legally be tried.22
The two Jacobins who attacked inviolability, on the other hand,
at least made an effort to bring new arguments to bear. Jean-Bon
Saint-Andre quizzed the supporters of inviolability as to their reasons
for invoking it for the former king. Why claim inviolability for Louis
if he was now only a common citizen? Further, he argued, the in-
violability granted to the monarch had been destroyed when the king
was dethroned and imprisoned; in short, the "general will" had re-
leased the citizens from what he termed an immoral oath. 23 In a
more reasoned approach, Bertrand Barere put the capstone on the anti-
inviolability case. Suppose for the sake of argument that royal in-
violability did exist. Even then it would not be necessary to consult
the people to deprive Louis of this constitutional shield, for the follow-
ing reasons: 1) the Paris-sponsored August 10 insurrection had destroyed
inviolability, the departments had applauded this action, therefore the
entire French nation had spoken; 2) the Legislative Assembly had
2°Archives, LV, 711.
2i|bid., LVI, 91
22|bid. r LVI, 122
23|bid., LVI, 117, 120.
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suspended and imprisoned the ex-king, and the nation had approved;
hence, the people had sanctioned a second time the end of royal
inviolability,- 3) the nation had given the Convention no mandate to
respect or reestablish inviolability; and 4) even if it were admitted that
those granting inviolability should revoke it, the decision should not go
to the primary assemblies since they had not been convoked to ratify
the Constitution of 1791 in the first place. 24
Ill
The fate of the inviolability issue, a controversy present throughout
the trial of Louis XVI, is easily told. On January 15-17, 1793, the
Convention voted on three questions, the first of which is of immediate
concern: "Is Louis guilty of criminal acts against the French nation?"
The results show that 683 deputies voted for the king's guilt, none voted
against. 25 The Convention then rejected the appeal to the primary
assemblies, voted death for Louis XVI,and defeated a move for reprieve.
On January 21, 1793, the blade of the guillotine fell on Louis le
dernier, as he was so often called during his trial. The tyrant, as one
conventionnel put it, was no longer.
If one considers the royal inviolability issue only as seen in the
course of the trial within the Convention, a few basic conclusions seem
inescapable. First, the controversy illustrates that no disciplined parties
existed in the Convention during the period of the trial. Lack of uni-
formity in presentation of arguments and emphasis, most noticeable
among Girondins, excludes consideration of group opinion as that of
organized political parties in the modern sense. Second, the declining
homogeneity among Girondins on this issue, plus the lack of originality
and ingenuity on the part of die-hard supporters of royal inviolability,
would suggest that the initial Girondin leadership of the Convention
was on the wane as the trial progressed. Third, the introduction of
the issue by the Girondin Pe'tion, and the lip-service given by several
other Girondin deputies, may be taken as part of the Right's poorly-
structured attempt to delay the trial. Finally, despite all the attention
to inviolability, its supporters did not carry their declarations to the
logical conclusion in the final determination of Louis's fate. In short,
itwould appear to this writer that the dozen or so deputies who invoked
inviolability for Louis XVI, if they had actually been serious in their
defense of it, would either had voted against Louis's guilt — since in
the legal sense he could hardly be considered guilty if truly inviolable —
or else they would have refused to vote. None, however, took either
action. These items do not provide conclusive proof that arguments
in support of royal inviolability were merely academic and dilatory, but
they leave this writer with something more than a strong suspicion that
they were.
24lbid., LVI, 203-204.
"Proces-Verbal, V, 197-223.
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